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We study the impact of global climate change on the prevalence of tropical diseases using a 
heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model. In our framework, households can 
take actions (e.g., purchasing bednets or other goods) that provide partial protection from 
disease. However, these actions are costly and households face borrowing constraints. 
Parameterizing the model, we explore the impact of a worldwide temperature increase of 3°C. 
We find that the impact on disease prevalence and especially output should be modest and can 
be mitigated by improvements in protection efficacy. 
JEL-Code: E13, E21, I10, O11, Q54. 







Department of Economics 
Williams College 
24 Hopkins Hall Drive 
USA – Williamstown, MA 01267 
dgollin@williams.edu 
Christian Zimmermann 
Department of Economics 
University of Connecticut 
341 Mansfield Road 
Unit 1063 







June 17, 2010 
This paper was written while Gollin was on leave at the Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies. 1 Introduction
Public health o￿cials often use the term ￿tropical diseases￿ to refer collectively to a list
of infectious diseases that are found primarily in developing countries. These include
malaria, schistosomiasis, dengue, trypanosomiasis, leprosy, cholera, and leishmaniasis,
among others. Many of these diseases are spread by insect vectors, and all of them
disproportionately a￿ect the world’s poor. Malaria is the most severe of these, with
the World Health Organization (WHO 2008a) estimating that the disease causes
about 250 million episodes of ￿acute illness￿ and perhaps 880,000 deaths annually. 1
But other diseases, less well known and sometimes described as ￿neglected,￿ also
impose grave burdens on people living in the tropics. The World Health Organization
estimates that ￿neglected tropical diseases￿ a￿ect over one billion people each year and
cause about 570,000 deaths annually (World Health Organization 2009). For example,
some 200 million people are currently infected with schistosomiasis, a parasite that is
transmitted through poor sanitation. 2 Perhaps 50 million cases of dengue occur each
year, of which 500,000 lead to devastating hemorrhagic fever, with 22,000 resulting
deaths.3
What makes these diseases ￿tropical￿? The diseases themselves are perfectly ca-
pable of infecting people in all climates, but they are transmitted by vectors that
are most common in hot environments: mosquitoes (malaria and dengue); biting ￿ies
(trypanosomiasis and Chagas disease); sand￿ies (leishmaniasis); and freshwater snails
(schistosomiasis). As Masters and McMillan (2001) have pointed out, most of these
vectors do not fare well in temperate zones that are susceptible to frost. Regular sea-
sonal frost does not eliminate the vectors, but it does appear to interfere with cycles
of transmission, making it harder for the diseases to sustain high levels of infection.
If cold weather is responsible for suppressing the vectors that transmit tropical
diseases, how will climate change alter the current distribution of these diseases?
Will we see malaria and other tropical diseases sweeping through rich countries? At
1Reported by WHO on the ￿Roll Back Malaria￿ program website at:
http://malaria.who.int/wmr2008/malaria2008.pdf .
2Of these, several million display serious health consequences. (Source:
http://www.who.int/schistosomiasis/en/index.html.)
3Dengue is also perhaps the fastest-growing of the tropical diseases, with a re-
cent dramatic increase in the number of cases observed around the world. See
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/dengue/impact/en/ for further information.
1present, infectious disease is a relatively minor source of the disease burden in today’s
rich temperate-zone countries. Will this change in future?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has speci￿cally investi-
gated the changing burdens of infectious disease that may result from climate change.
One IPCC background report notes that:
Climate plays a dominant role in determining the distribution and abun-
dance of insects and tick species ￿ directly, through its e￿ects on vector
and parasite development, and indirectly through its e￿ects on host plants
and animals and land-use changes.... Therefore, it is anticipated that cli-
mate change will have an e￿ect on the geographical range and seasonal
activity of vector species and, potentially, disease transmission... 4
The IPCC studies soberly suggest that the capacity of medical and public health
systems in most rich countries are su￿cient to prevent tropical diseases from reaching
epidemic levels, under the assumed range of warming that is expected to accompany
climate change. Not all observers share this con￿dence, however; one leading scholar
argues that ￿...[A] warming and unstable climate is playing an ever increasing role
in driving the global emergence, resurgence, and redistribution of infectious diseases￿
(Epstein 2004, p. 383).
This paper speci￿cally takes up the question of how climate change might be
expected to alter the distribution and severity of tropical diseases? Will increasing
temperatures lead to the spread of mosquitoes and other insect vectors and thereby
expand infectious diseases to the previously ￿safe￿ countries of the temperate zone?
Or will the biological impacts of climate change be mitigated by human adaptation
and behavioral responses? If both e￿ects are present, how will they be balanced?
We view these questions as fundamentally related to human behavioral choices ￿
at the individual level as well as at the level of government policies. Although climate
change may a￿ect the spatial distribution of vectors and pathogens, human exposure
to disease is not a mechanical function of environmental conditions. In many or most
tropical diseases, either the vector or the pathogen must spend at least a portion of
its lifecycle in humans. This means that humans a￿ect the level of disease prevalence
through their choices about prevention and treatment of the diseases.
4See: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=507.
2Given that human choices are critical, we approach our questions from the per-
spective of economists. We use a model in which individuals make conscious and
rational choices that a￿ect their disease exposure and infection status. Individual
choices may not be socially optimal: there are infection externalities operating in this
environment. Nevertheless, we begin by considering the competitive equilibrium of
a dynamic general equilibrium model in which people face a risk of infection from
diseases in each period. People in the model economy make choices that a￿ect their
exposure to the disease, as in the real world they may buy drugs, bednets, or other
goods that allow them to prevent or treat the diseases that they face.
To assess the overall impact of climate change on disease prevalence, we consider
the e￿ects of changes in the parameter that describes the ￿ecology of disease￿ in the
model. In e￿ect, we make disease transmission easier. We then ask how this alters
levels of infection and also the levels of steady-state output in the model economy.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of malaria
that incorporates important features of both economic and epidemiological models.
Section 3 parameterizes, or ￿calibrates￿ this model to match some central features of
the data. Section 4 describes the results of several experiments undertaken using the
model economy. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A useful model of climate change and its impact on disease must have certain features.
For example, it must represent infection through some plausible process. Disease
should a￿ect people’s choices and perhaps also their resources and abilities. And it
is useful to consider actions that people can take that alter their exposure to the
disease ￿ either by avoiding infection or by treating (or curing) infections once they
occur. In short, to understand the impact of climate change on the prevalence of a
human disease, we think it is essential to take into account how people react and do
something about the environment they live in. Thus, a model needs the following
components:
1. agents that react to the disease and economic environment;
2. an economic environment that is in￿uenced by the prevalence of the disease;
33. a law of motion for the disease that is at least partially in￿uenced by humans;
4. economic constraints that potentially prevent an eradication of the disease;
5. heterogeneity among agents, as only some carry the disease, and not all face
the same economic constraints;
6. general equilibrium e￿ects, as the prevalence of the disease does not only af-
fect the ailing agents, but also the healthy ones through prices and potential
exposure to the disease.
Thus, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents, following Gollin and Zimmermann (2010). This is a model of perpetual youth,
where agents stochastically catch a disease, and die with probabilities that depend on
their health status. The likelihood of falling sick depends on the proportion of people
already sick, as well as on ecological factors that can change with climate change.
Once sick, people remain so for the rest of their lives and su￿er productivity losses
because of absences from work or diminished abilities.
However, economic agents have access to a technology that can at least partially
protect them from getting infected. This technology is costly and needs to be paid
for in lump sum fashion before it is used. This might correspond to a vaccine, or
alternatively a long-lasting bednet or a set of screens for a house. The ￿xed cost of
this preventive measure poses a problem for individuals in the economy, as agents do
not necessarily have the funds available for this purchase, especially at the beginning
of their economic life. Indeed, we assume that borrowing is not possible in this
economy.
Agents earn income in two ways. First, they work and obtain a wage that corre-
sponds to their marginal productivity of labor. The latter is in￿uenced by their health
status, an idiosyncratic and persistent productivity shock and the overall marginal
productivity of labor. Second, they earn interest on their savings, at the overall
marginal productivity of capital. Factor prices are determined from a production
function that uses aggregates of e￿cient labor units and savings across the entire
model economy.
We now turn to the detailed description of this economy, starting with workers.
There is a unit measure of them and they maximize their lifetime expected discounted








s.t. cit + ki;t+1 + pitq  wthitit + rtkit; 8t;
kit > 0; 8t;
where, for agent i in period t, cit is consumption, kit is capital, pit is a binary decision
to purchase protection against the disease, hit is the health status and it is an
idiosyncratic productivity shock. u() is a utility function with the usual properties, 
is the discount rate, d() is the probability of death, q is the price of health protection,
wt is the e￿ciency wage and rt is the return of capital. Idiosyncratic productivity
shocks it follow a persistent binomial Markov process.
Individuals are born healthy and without assets, replacing those who just died.
Within each period, an unprotected individual may catch a disease with probabil-
ity st. Being sick is an absorbing state and entails a loss in productivity, so that
hit =  h < 1 instead of hit = 1.
We now turn to aggregates. E￿ciency units of labor and individual capital are















This translates into the probability of catching the disease st by combining St with





((1   vit) + vite)f(Z;St) iff(Z;St) >  s
0 iff(Z;St)   s
5Note that below a threshold  s, a disease is not sustainable and vanishes.
We solve this model economy by restricting ourselves to steady states. The recur-
sive steady state equilibrium is de￿ned by decisions for consumption, capital and
protection purchase, prices for labor and capital, distributions of agents over health
status and capital holdings, aggregate labor, capital and disease prevalence such that
individuals maximize their problem given prices and aggregates, ￿rms likewise max-
imize pro￿ts, factors markets are e￿cients, distributions are ergodic and individual
decisions are consistent with aggregates.
There is always at least one equilibrium, a disease-free one. If the threshold  s = 0,
there is another one with some disease prevalence. Indeed, even if everyone buys
protection, newborns can still catch a disease in the ￿rst period and thus perpetuate
it. If the threshold is higher, such an equilibrium may not exist.
3 Calibration
As we are interested in quantitative answers, we need to calibrate this model economy;
i.e., we must select functional forms and ￿nd values for all parameters. In most
respects, we follow Gollin and Zimmermann (2010), which o￿ers a more detailed
explanation of the calibration.













where  is a multiplier that captures the value of life. Indeed, without it, utility may
be negative and thus agents may prefer death, which has zero utility.
Finally, we need a functional form to transform disease prevalence into a proba-




with both Z and St between zero and one and  strictly positive.
We now turn to putting numbers to parameters. We assume a periodicity of a year.
Thus we set  at 0.95 and  = 1, which corresponds to logarithmic utility. To set ,
we observe from Viscusi and Aldy (2003) that the value of life in the US is about $7
million, or 11.3 times lifetime consumption. Thus we set  = 11:3.
For the productivity loss due to sickness, we set it at 10% following Bleakley’s work
on malaria (2003). This is a middle-of-the-road estimate from a wide distribution of
micro studies in the literature. For some other diseases, infected people may be
severely debilitated and may su￿er from greater productivity losses. Others, because
they cause only sporadic ill e￿ects, may have smaller e￿ects on lifetime income. Thus
 h = 0:9.5
We use Domeij and Heathcote (2004) to establish the binary process for the id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks it. Shocks are 22:4%, with a 90% chance of repeat-
ing the following year. The annual death rate is set to 1.5% for healthy people and
7.5% for sick people. The fertility rate is set to keep population constant, as required
by a steady-state. This is also consistent with observed positive correlations between
fertility and mortality rates.
Regarding the protection against the disease, we need to establish its e￿cacy and
its cost. Note again that we model the preventive good as something that is purchased
one time and then provides continued protection for a lifetime. Given the borrow-
ing constraint, this would appear to impose strong limitations to the availability of
protection. Yet Gollin and Zimmermann (2010) show that this cost must rise to 1.5
times the average annual income to prevent everyone in the economy from purchas-
ing prevention as soon as they can possibly a￿ord it. Thus, people in this economy
display a strong desire to protect themselves from disease. This desire would be even
greater if we increased the productivity losses associated with sickness.
5Note that setting the productivity loss higher does not necessarily increase the impact of the
disease in equilibrium; instead, as the disease becomes more costly to individuals, there are greater
incentives for people to purchase protection. In equilibrium, this may decrease the fraction of the
population infected, leading to a reduction in the aggregate costs of the disease.
7Taking into account the strong demand for prevention, we set the cost of the
preventive good at one quarter of the annual average income in a disease free economy,
with the understanding that considerable variation in this cost will not a￿ect results.
Although people do not need to purchase the preventive good again, the protection
that it provides may be imperfect. Vaccines are not always e￿ective, and mosquito
nets or screens provide only partial protection from disease. In our model, we note
that a mosquito net reduces the probability of catching malaria by 70%. Combining
this with other methods may increase it further, but would still keep it far from 100%.
For example, a proposed malaria vaccine is expected to have an e￿cacy of only 50%.
Thus, we explore di￿erent values for the e￿cacy of protection between 70% and 90%.
Next, we need to calibrate the parameters for the infection rate process. We use
the malaria-ecology index of Sachs et al. (2004), rescaled to the unit interval, to
measure Z. The elasticity  is found by regressing observed infection rates on the
malaria ecology. We ￿nd  = 0:122.
Lastly, we have to determine the prevalence threshold that enables a natural
eradication of the disease,  s. Unfortunately, the literature is not clear about whether
eradication is feasible. In the case of malaria, for example, few are willing to commit
to any hard numbers. Those that do disagree: WHO (2008b) claims a country may be
ready for a concerted eradication e￿ort if the annual infection rate falls below 0.1%.
Others claim it needs to be signi￿cantly lower than that. Because of this uncertainty,
we consider a range of di￿erent values, starting with a value of zero (no threshold
e￿ect).
4 Quantitative Analysis and Results
In our framework, an increase in temperature will be equivalent to an increase in the
malaria ecology parameter, Z. In the original index developed by Sachs et al. (2004),
temperature is one of several variables used to construct the index value. When
we compare our re-scaled measure of Z for di￿erent countries to the average annual
temperature average annual temperature from 1972-2001, we ￿nd a strong positive
relationship between temperature and the malaria ecology for countries with values
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of Z > 0:3. (See Figure 1.)6
Thus, we simulate the e￿ect of climate change by solving the model economy as
calibrated above for di￿erent values of Z between 0.3 and 1.0 and for di￿erent degrees
of protection e￿cacy. In this context, e￿cacy refers to the ability of the protective
bundle to provide protection from the disease. Perfect e￿cacy of 100% would imply
that someone who purchased the protective bundle would never get infected; e￿cacy
of 90% implies that someone purchasing the protective bundle faces a 90% reduction
6Data on temperature were taken from the appendix to Jones and Olken (2010), which are
available online at: Climate Shocks and Exports with Ben Jones. American Economic Review Papers
and Proceedings, forthcoming 2010. Data and programs at: http://econ-www.mit.edu/￿les/5131.
The temperatures used here are based on detailed observations for di￿erent geographic cells within
countries; the country averages are based on population-weighted averages of these temperatures.
9in the probability of infection; and so on. In these scenarios, we consider protection
e￿cacies of 70%, 80% and 90%.7 The results are summarized in Figure (2) for output
and Figure (3) for the proportion of sick people.
For output, we see in Figure 2 that for a given level of protection e￿cacy, a
higher level of Z implies lower steady-state output per person; hence, each of the
curves shown in the ￿gure is downward sloping. We also see that higher levels of
e￿cacy lead to improvements in output per person (shifting the curves as illustrated).
We represent climate change here as a movement along an iso-e￿cacy curve. The
￿gure suggests that the consequences of climate change may be relatively modest
in this model economy. Similar patterns are evident when we look at the e￿ects of
an increase in temperature on disease prevalence. Figure 3 shows the relationship
between infection rates and Z for the same three di￿erent levels of e￿cacy.
What do these numbers mean for climate change of the magnitudes currently
predicted by climate models? Climate change is estimated to increase average world
temperature by 1 to 6 C. Taking 3 C as a benchmark, this would e￿ectively give
New York City a climate like that of present-day Washington, DC; Rome would see
its average annual temperature rise to that of present-day Algiers. In terms of malaria
ecology, such a temperature change would correspond to an increase in Z of 0.192,
based on the relationship shown in Figure 1. 8
Table 1 shows that the impact of climate change through disease is relatively mod-
est. We consider three scenarios that di￿er in terms of the e￿cacy of the protective
good. The change in output corresponds to less than a year in real GDP growth. The
change in the number of sick people is minimal (it is a percentage of a percentage).
Locally the impact could be stronger or reversed if one factors in changes in rainfall,
which are predicted to increase or decrease depending on location.
Why is the impact so small? For one, temperature is only one factor in malaria
ecology. Also, diseases like malaria may not have that much of an aggregate impact
7At a protection e￿cacy of 100%, aggregates are una￿ected as everybody but a tiny proportion
of the population is immune, and changes in the ecological environment have a minimal impact. In
any case, 100% is by far not realistic with current technologies.
8Speci￿cally, we used a linear regression of Z on a constant and the average annual temperature
variable, measured in degrees C. This yielded a highly signi￿cant coe￿cient on temperature of 0.064.
For a shift of 3 C , this gives an increase in Z of approximately 0.192.
10Table 1: Impact of a 3C increase in temperature on output and number of sick people
(in %)
Protection e￿cacy output sick
90% -0.40 ￿ -0.96 +0.65 ￿ +2.22
80% -0.26 ￿ -1.22 +0.43 ￿ +1.99
70% -0.13 ￿ -1.03 +0.32 ￿ +1.62
on rich economies, as our previous research has suggested, because people are likely
to pay for protection. Only if the protective technologies are ine￿ective or if people
are simply unable to a￿ord them would we expect to ￿nd large economic impacts. 9
Would climate change make malaria sustainable where it was not before? Seeing
the disease prevalence in Figure (3), it seems unlikely that any of the thresholds
for eradication would cross any of the curves. While some areas with high malaria
potential currently are free from it, for example Singapore, it is not because they
are below the threshold. In other words, we do not ￿nd that rich temperate-zone
countries will avoid the burdens of tropical disease by actually eradicating them;
instead, our model suggests that the disease burdens will be very modest because
people are able to protect and treat themselves easily. As a result, very few people
will ever be infected, and transmission will be very low ￿ though not impossible.
Climate change will increase the burden of tropical diseases in our model. How-
ever, rather modest improvements in protection e￿cacy could compensate for the
consequences of climate change. For example, an improvement in e￿cacy from 70%
to 80% improves GDP by 6￿8% and decreases the number of sick people by about
10%, much larger e￿ects than those mentioned in Table 1.
9We note, however, that there may be large welfare impacts even if GDP per capita is not greatly
a￿ected.
11Figure 2:











Output, no disease threshold, by efficiency
5 Conclusions
Will global climate change increase signi￿cantly the prevalence of tropical diseases
such as malaria? We answered this question using a heterogeneous agent dynamic
general equilibrium model where households have the opportunity to react to the
prevalence of diseases. We ￿nd that a middle-of-the-road scenario with an increase of
temperature of 3 C would lead to rather modest increase in disease prevalence and
12Figure 3:







Proportion sick, no disease threshold, by efficiency
13very modest disease-induced losses in GDP per capita. We ￿nd that households will
elect to acquire protection as soon as they can, typically within the very ￿rst years,
thus mitigating considerably the impact of global climate change in this respect.
In particular, we ￿nd that the cost of protection is generally unimportant: house-
holds value life su￿ciently to absorb considerable expenses in the name of prophylaxis.
A more important factor in the e￿cacy of protection. With current technology, e￿-
cacy between 70% and 90% is attainable, and future developments will certainly drive
up these ￿gures. The e￿ects of improvements in disease protection will, in this sense,
more than compensate for the impact of global climate change. Improvements in the
e￿cacy of disease prophylaxis can potentially have large impacts on welfare.
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